ï. INTRODUCTION
Societies are frequently encountered with the problem of selecting some alternative from a set of feasible alternatives. This situation can take the form of electing a candidate to some public office, selecting a policy that is to be implemented ? or any of a number of similar situations. For convenience, this study is developed in the context of electing a candidate from a set of candidates competing for élection to office. The purpose of this study is to examine the actual process of selecting an élection winner.
How should we go about seiecting the winner of an élection? In order to consider this question it is first necessary to identify factors that are relevant to the élection process. Three major factors are economie cost of implementation, level of voter input that results, and spécifie properties of the élection process being considered. Both cost of implementation and ievel of voter input can be associated with the degree of complexity of the voting process being used, Consider the implementation costs of single-stage and multi-stage élection procedures. In a single-stage élection the voters cast their ballots only once and the winner is selected on the basis of the information contained on the ballot. In a multi-stage élection the voters must cast ballots more than once. In each intermediate stage of a multi-stage élection the ballot information is used to drop candidates from considération in later stages of the élection. Losers are dropped in each intermediate stage and the winner is determined in the last stage.
À multi-stage élection is obviously going to be more costly than a single-stage élection both in terms of economie cost of implementation and level of voter input. Having to set up polling places for each stage, having to print up new ballots in each stage, and other costs cause the multi-stage élection to be much more costly than single-stage élections. However, for élections of some importance the economie cost of a voting process may not be considered as a significant factor, The level of voter input is important and as élection processes become more complicated fewer individuals in the society wiü participate by actually voting. Greater voter tumout would be expected to result in a winner that more accurateïy reflects the overall préférence of the society. Thus an increased voter level of participation should be vie wed as a positive factor. The use of multi-state élections is a defmite complicating factor that could reduce the level of voter input.
Degrees of complication can also arise when considering single-stage élections by themseives, öf particular importance is the considération of non-ranked voting procedures versus ranked voting procedures. For an élection on m candidates a non-ranked voting procedure requires voters to select some number, say k, of candidates. Each voter can select his or her k most preferred candidates by doing something like checking off boxes next to the names of candidates on the ballot. The winner is then selected as the candidate receiving the most votes.
For a ranked voting procedure individuaîs must do more than report their k most preferred candidates. Voters must also rank these k most preferred candidates from most preferred to least preferred. Since non-ranked voting procedures require less effort on the part of voters we might expect a greater voter turnout if they are used instead of ranked voting procedures. To select a winner in a ranked voting procedure, weighted scoring rules are often used. For an m candidate élection a weighted scoring rule consists of m weights w } . «• 2 , . t . 9 w m with w t ^ «>£+ i and w m ^ 0, Each voter then gives a score of w t R.A.I.R.O. Recherche opérationnelle/Opérations Research to his or her i-th most preferred candidate and the winner is selected as the candidate receiving the greatest total score from ail voters.
In considering the third relevant factor of élection processes, properties of the élection process, a very important concern is how well an élection procedure does at selecting a candidate that is, in some sensé, the candidate most preferred by the society. There are a number of criteria that can be used to détermine this overall most preferred candidate and we shall consider two of the most common ones, namely the Condorcet Criterion [5] and the Borda Criterion [3] .
For a candidate to be the Condorcet winner voters' préférences must be such that this candidate would be able to defeat ail other candidates by simple majority voting in a series of pairwise élections, That is, if there were only two candidates in an élection and the Condorcet winner was one of them then it would be the majority rule winner. The Condorcet Criterion requires that the Condorcet winner should be selected as the winner when a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that voters' préférences might be such that no Condorcet winner exists but if there is one it would be a désirable candidate for sélection as the winner. Various properties of Condorcet voting rules are given in [1, 2, 6, 18, 20, 23] . To obtain the Condorcet winner, the minimum voter input required on a ballot would be the total préférence ranking for each voter.
For a candidate to be the Borda winner voters' préférences must be such that this candidate maximizes the total number of instances in which a candidate is preferred to any other candidate, provided that voters are never indifferent bet ween candidates. Borda rule is a member of the family of weighted scoring rules. For m candidates the scoring rùle weights are w 1 , w 2 > ..., u? m and for Borda rule the différence in weights vù i -vo^ is proportional to j -i for all i and j. An example of Borda weights is w^m -i for ail i. Any example of Borda weights, linearly decreasing w[s, must resuit in the same winner. Various properties of Borda rule are presented in [2, 6, 11, 12, 25, 27] . The minimum voter input required on a ballot would be the total préférence ranking for each voter if Borda rule is used.
Justification can be made for using either the Condorcet Criterion or the Borda Criterion when deciding how to develop an élection process. Ho wever, if either a Condorcet rule or Borda rule is used then each voter will be required to rank all candidates from most preferred to least preferred. An additional problem develops for the Condorcet Criterion since some other rule must be implemented to pick a winner when no Condorcet winner exists.
The most commonly used élection processes are single-stage non-ranked voting procedures. These are also referred to as constant scoring rules since they can be thought of as trivial weighted scoring rules. The constant scoring rule vote for k candidates, denoted by Rille C ks results in the same winner as the weighted scoringrule with w ( = l for z = l, 2, .. ., k&ndwj~QïoTj~k + l ? k + 2, ...,m. These constant scoring rules are primariiy used due to their simplicity of implementation.
The natural subject of considération is how well these simple constant scoring rules do relative to the Condorcet Criterion and the Borda Criterion. If in fact these constant scoring rules are qui te likely to obtain a winner that is identical to the Borda winner or Condorcet winner then it would be quite logical to use the simpler and lower cost constant scoring rules.
Some measure is needed to détermine how likely constant scoring rules are to piek winners according to the Condorcet Criterion and Borda Criterion. One measure has been developed by Fishburn [8] and it is referred to as efficiency. The Condorcet efficienty of Rule C k on m alternatives^ denoted by E™, is the probability that Rule C k will piek the Condorcet winner given that a Condorcet winner exists. In order to make statements about these probabilities it is necessary to make some assumptions about voters' préférences. For an m candidate élection there are m ! (m factorial) possible linear préférence rankings on the candidates. The condition of impartial culture is usually assumed such that if a voter is selected at random his or her préférence ranking on the candidates is equally likely to be any one of the m! possible linear rankings. Impartial culture only considers linear préférence rankings so voters' préférences are assumed to contain no indifférence bet ween candidates. It is also assumed in the current study and in all other studies mentioned that all individuals vote sincerely according to theîr préférences and that all individuals vote independently.
À number of studies have been conducted to détermine both simulation estimâtes and exact values of E™ for various voting procedures under the assumption of impartial culture [7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 21) , Studies reported in [4] and [13] have considered Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules with assumptions on voters' préférences other than that of impartial culture. Analytical results which give information about the gênerai behavior of E™ have not only made the assumption of impartial culture but have also assumed that the number of voters, n, is large (n -*• oo) [14, 15, 16, 17] , In ail further discussion E™ will refer to the Condorcet efficiency of Rule C k under the assumption of impartial culture as n-* co. In [15] the Condorcet efficiency of plurality rule 3 in gênerai Rule C ti is considered for three candidate élections and it is shown that £3_jg3 -.901189. Thus, for impartial culture with large électorales either plurality (fc= 1) or négative pîuraîity (k -2) can be used with equal Condorcet efficiency and the Condorcet winner will be elected over nînety percent of the time when there is a Condorcet winner.
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While exact numericai values of E™ are not available for m greater than three some analytical results have been obtained in [17] which prove that E k n =E™_ k for ail k and that E™ S E™ +i for ail k ^ (m-2)/2. Therefore, the Condorcet efficiency of Rule C k is the same as that of Rule C m _ fc . It should be noted that Rule C m _ k is equivalent to requiring individuals to vote against k of the candidates. So the Condorcet efficiency of the vote for k rule is the same as the Condorcet efficiency of the vote against k rule for large electorates under impartial culture. These results also indicate that the most Condorcet efficient constant scoring rule requires individuals to vote for about half of the candidates on the ballot. If m is even Rule C m/2 is most Condorcet efficient and if m is odd Rule C (m _ 1)/2 and Rule C (m+1)/2 are equally most Condorcet efficient.
Borda efficiency can be defmed with a probability statement similar to the one defming Condorcet efficiency. However, since Borda rule must always resuit with some candidate as the Borda winner no conditional statement is needed in the probability définition. Let B™ be the Borda efficiency or probability that the Rule C k winner coincides with the Borda winner under the assumption of impartial culture. Much less research has been done concerning Borda efficiency than Condorcet efficiency even though Borda rule has many positive properties and deserves considération. Some estimâtes of Borda efficiencies for various voting rules have been obtained by computer simulation [8, 9] . Analytical results concerning B™ have been restricted to the three alternative case with the assumption of n-> oo. We assume from this point on that B™ is the Borda efficiency of Rule C k under impartial culture as n ->• oo. In [16] it was shown that B\ = .758338 so that plurality rule will select the Borda winner more than seventy-five percent of the time under impartial culture with a large electorate.
The purpose of the current study is to examine the behavior of J3™. In the next section a représentation of B™ is obtained for gênerai m and fe. It is then shown that B™ = B™_ k for ail k and that B^ ^ fl? +1 for ail k g (m -2)/2. Thus, we fmd a behavior of B™ that is identical to the behavior of ££\ The Borda efficiency of the vote for k rule is identical to the Borda efficiency of the vote against k rule. The most Borda efficient constant scoring rule is Ruie C m/2 when m is even and when m is odd the equally most Borda efficient rules are RuleC (m _ 1)/2 C(m+i)/2-Conclusions are presented in the final section.
A REPRESENTATION FOR BORDA EFFICIENCY
We wish to obtain an analytical représentation of B™, the probability that the Rule C k winner coincides with the Borda winner for m alternatives and n voters under impartial culture as M-• oo. Individuals are assumed to vote sincerely, according to their préférences, and they are assumed to vote independently. We begin by ftnding a représentation for the probability of coincidence of the Rule C k winner and the weighted scoring rule winner with gênerai weights w li Wi> -• • > w m-The results for Borda winner coincidence with the Rule C k winner will then be treated as a special case.
Let the m candidates be denoted by A 1 , A 2 , . . ., A m . Each voter is equally likely to have any one of the m ! linear préférence rankings on the candidates under the impartial culture assumption. Let W% be the probability that any spécifie candidate, say A x , is both the Rule C k winner and the weighted scoring rule winner with weights w 1 ,w 2 , ..., w m . By the symmetry of impartial culture B k =m W% when the weights in the weighted scoring rule are Borda weights with w~m -i. Therefore, the behavior of W£ with Borda weights will be exactly the same as the behavior of B k .
To obtain a gênerai représentation of W£ we define 2 (m ~ 1 ) discrete variables which describe the linear préférence ranking for a given voter.
if A 1 is ranked among the k most preferred alternatives and A i+1 is ranked among the m -k least preferred alternatives.
if A i + 1 is ranked among the k most preferred alternatives and A 1 is ranked among the m -k least preferred alternatives.
otherwise.
if A x is rankedath and A i+1 is rankedbth where x t and y t are defined for i = l, 2, ..., m-L Let x,-and y t dénote the average of x t and y t over the n voters. An examination of the définitions will show that A 1 is the Rule C k winner when x ( > 0 for all i and that A j is the weighted scoring rule winner when y t > 0 for all z. Therefore, W k * is the probability that y t > 0 and x t > 0 for all i as n -> oo under impartial culture. As n -> oo the probability that x t = 0 or y i =0 for any i goes to zero. W£ can thus be defined as the probability that y \ ^ 0 and 5c t ^ 0 for all Ï. Since the right-hand sides of these inequalities is always zero it foliows that W£ can also be defmed as the probability that x t sjn ^ 0 and y i ^Jn ^ 0 for all i. We can obtain a représentation for W% under this last définition as n -> oo by appealing to the multivariate extension of the central limit theorem [26] . As n ~+ oo the joint distribution of the x ( <J~n and y t ^Jn variables is multivariate normal.
Again by the symmetry of the impartial culture condition, E{x i ) = E(y i ) = 0 and thus E {x t yfn) = E (y t yfn) = 0 for ail i where E dénotes expected value. Our définition of W$ can now be stated as the probability that the x i yfn and y t yfn variables ail exceed their respective means. By this définition W£ is the positive orthant probability of the multivariate normal distribution of the x t y/n and y t yfn variables. The fact that we are dealing with a positive orthant probability will greatly simplify things later. The positive orthant probability of a multivariate normal distribution can be expressed totally in terms of the corrélation matrix of the distribution.
It has already been noted that E (x i ) = E(y i ) = 0 so to obtain the corrélation matrix we need E (xf), E (y?), E (y^), E {x ( Xj) , and E (x t^-). From previous studies [14, 17] :
We can obtain the corrélation matrix after finding E (x t y } ). This is done for the case of i=j first and then for i #7. To obtain £(*; 3^) we know that x ( y t is positive if A x is among the k most preferred and A i+1 is among the m -k least preferred candidates. There are (m -2)! rankings which allow this, and each ranking has a probability of l/m\. To generalize, this: The corrélation matrix p thus has:
where VFor a fixed set of w t values the corrélation matrix is solely a function of the k value of the Rule C k being used. Since W£ is a positive orthant probability the results of Slepian [24] apply and W\ is maximized by the k which maximizes z with:
2k(m-fe)E I ( Wi -«;,) 2 
J
We could therefore define a weighted scoring rule efficiency, as was done for Condorcet efficiency and Borda efficiency. The Rule C k that would maximize the weighted scoring rule efficiency would correspond to the k that maximized z.
We now turn our attention to Borda efficiency and recall that Borda rule is equivalent to the weighted scoring rule with w^m -i. If we substitute this relation into the équation for z and use known relations for sums of powers of integers [22] the spécifie z' that results is: 3k(m-fe) T /2 J By previous discussion B™ is only a fonction of the corrélation matrix and thus only of z '. Since z ' is symmetrie in k around m/2 it follows that B™ = B™_ k . For integer valued /c, the k closest to m/2 maximizes z '. Therefore B™ is maximized by Rule C m/2 when m is even and when m is odd B™ is equally maximized by Rule C (m _ 1)/2 and Rule C 3. CONCLUSIONS Constant scoring rules were examined on the basis of Condorcet efficiency in [17] and the current study considers the Borda efficiency of constant scoring rules. It is assumed in both studies that the number of voters is large and that voters' préférences meet the condition of impartial culture. It is seen by both efficiency measures that the vote for k rule is equivalent to the vote against k rule. Also, by both efficiency measures the most efficient rule is Rule C m(2 when m is even or either of Rule C (m _ 1)/2 or Rule C (m+1)/2 when m is odd. It can be concluded that if the condition of impartial culture is reasonable for a large electorate then serious considération should be given to the voting rule which requires individuals to vote for half of the candidates on the ballot.
